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Culture as History:  
Envisioning Change Across and Beyond “Eastern” and “Western” Civilizations in the 
May Fourth Era 
 
This paper explores the new imaginaries of change available to reformers during the 
May Fourth movement by examining an often-overlooked but influential debate about the 
value of “Eastern” and “Western” civilizations.  In this debate, which arose amid the collapse 
of the first Chinese republic in the early nineteen-teens, participants elaborated sometimes 
fanciful civilizational histories to locate China’s position within increasingly multicultural 
dimensions of space and time.  Their trans-historical, trans-cultural comparisons eventually 
gave rise to the normative East-West binarism that by the early 1920s had become 
“commonplace” in Chinese political discourse.1  The civilization debate marked several 
distinctive innovations in Chinese discourse about the means and purposes of Western 
learning, particularly the ways in which certain forms of historical understanding determined 
the significance and identity of cultural difference, the possibility of cultural transformation, 
and the role of Western modernity in China’s future.  Typically, scholars tend to characterize 
May Fourth attitudes to history as tied to an understanding of modernity “defined in a context 
of unilinear time” seen to be universal.2  The broader conversation over Eastern and Western 
                                                 
1 Leo Ou-fan Lee, “Incomplete Modernity: Rethinking the May Fourth Project,” in The 
Appropriation of Cultural Capital: China’s May Fourth Project, ed. Milena Doleželová-
Velingerová and Oldrich Kral (Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), 41. 
2 Leo Ou-fan Lee, “In Search of Modernity: Some Reflections on a New Mode of 
Consciousness in Twentieth Century Chinese History and Literature,” in Ideas Across 
Cultures: Essays on Chinese Thought in Honor of Benjamin I. Schwartz, ed. Paul A. Cohen 
and Merle Goldman (Harvard University Asia Center, 1990), 111; Joseph R. Levenson, 
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civilizations shows, however, that more subtle and diverse understandings of China’s future 
are also at stake, and these contrast in revealing ways to earlier views of historical unfolding.  
Participants recognized, as Li Changzhi (李長之 1911-1978) were to put it later, that “culture 
is a thing with a history.”3 This meant that even radical Westernizers could not follow late-
Qing reformers in assuming that China’s difference from Western nations would eventually 
be resolved through a universal process of historical evolution.  Their conversations wrestled 
with a growing recognition that what earlier reformers had attempted to borrow from the 
West—constitutions, human rights, technological advancement—could not be plucked out of 
the present or awaited in the inevitable future, but had to evolve out of historical institutions, 
attitudes, and even contingency that could not be replicated very easily. 
I advance a close reading of the debate to show how this historicized view of culture 
enabled particular ways of thinking creatively about cultural change that were not available to 
earlier reformers.  For activists and scholars who promoted science, democracy, and the 
radical destruction of what they saw as China’s traditional, “feudal” value system, culture’s 
historicity may have denied the evolutionary promise of modernization.  However, it made 
transformative change in Chinese social life imaginable in a different way, by underscoring 
the malleability of China’s historical resources in constructing a new vision for a globalized, 
Westernized future. Young May Fourth iconoclasts such as Chen Duxiu (陳獨秀 1879-1942), 
for example, denied the Chinese past completely and attempted to create a new Western 
history within the Chinese future. From this radical perspective, the present age inaugurated a 
new era that attached itself to the Western rather than Chinese past, and as it unfolded, it 
                                                                                                                                                        
Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1958). 
3 Li Changzhi, “Wusi yundong,” in Li Changzhi wenji, vol. 1 (Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu 
chubanshe, 2006), 24. 
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entered not a universal stage of history so much as a Europeanized one.  More moderate 
opinion, in contrast, saw the contingency and historicity of Western cultural development as 
denying the subordination of China’s “traditional” past. They heralded an open-ended global 
future in which China would play a central role.  Influential intellectuals such as Du Yaquan 
(杜亞泉 1873-1923) and a pre-communist Li Dazhao (李大釗 1889-1927) urged a blending 
of civilizations from the present moment forward, to create a wholly new syncretic 
civilization in locales both Chinese and Western.   
I begin with an overview of the basic positions in the civilizations debate, surveying 
earlier precedents as well as some of the key questions around which these conversations 
centered.  I go on to discuss how these May Fourth innovations in historical consciousness 
facilitated the imagination of change in the present, by introducing new ways of thinking 
about the past and future.  Although ostensibly about the character of “Eastern” and “Western” 
culture, the debates turned crucially on where participants located the position of China in 
history: was China’s present the mark of a developmental laggard and a failed society, the 
recrudescence of a living and continuous tradition, or the site of a future global cultural 
syncretism?  These questions stand in marked contrast to the late Qing reform strategies of 
thinkers such as Liang Qichao (梁啟超 1873-1929) and Yan Fu (嚴復 1854-1921), who 
grounded reform on “universal laws” (公理gong li) of global evolution. It also contradicted 
nineteenth-century essence/use (体用ti/yong) logic which tended to view culture as a 
repository of unchanging values outside of time. For both radical and moderate voices of the 
May Fourth movement, the same passage of time that gave rise to particular cultural 
formations in other civilizations in the past, is now seen to secure the possibility of those 
same cultural developments elsewhere, in the future.  What these May Fourth thinkers shared, 
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then, was not so much a commitment to human universals, as many scholars have assumed,4 
but a faith that the future was the site of cultural transformation and possibility.   
 
Eastern and Western Civilizations 
Earlier Iterations 
Theoretical speculation about the nature of differences between “Eastern” (or 
sometimes more specifically “Chinese”) and “Western” civilization emerged as early as the 
Opium Wars in the mid-nineteenth century.  Perhaps its most well-known motif was zhong ti 
xi yong, “Chinese learning for essence (ti), Western learning for use (yong),” a formulation 
made famous by Zhang Zhidong (張之洞 1837-1909) in his 1898 tract Exhortation to 
Learning (Quan Xue Pian).  In this essay, written shortly after the unexpected and 
humiliating defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese war, Zhang offers a guardedly progressive 
call to Chinese elites to adopt in a more thoroughgoing way the instrumental features of 
Western learning (Xi xue).5  At this time, “new” learning was often seen as identical with 
                                                 
4 Huters, for example, characterizes the debate as a “contest over universal values.” Bringing 
the World Home: Appropriating the West in Late Qing and Early Republican China 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), Chapter 8;  Duara also argues that “the 
critique of [hegemonic Enlightenment] History through culture...was linked to a redemptive 
universalist model.” Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning 
Narratives of Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 207. 
5 Zhang is often labelled a conservative, but as Tze-ki Hon persuasively argues, the Quan Xue 
Pian meant to strike a balance between conservative and radical reform. In that sense it was 
“part of the ongoing debate on how to change the country based on critical re-examination of 
its institutions and substantial borrowings form the West.” See “Zhang Zhidong’s Proposal 
for Reform: The Quan Xue Pian,” in Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and 
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“Western” learning, and even thinkers like Zhang—who included as one of the five main 
points of his Exhortation to Learning the need to “understand change”—did not construe 
newness as a historical concept.6  Zhang claimed, for example, that the five relationships 
which constituted the essence of Chinese learning, and “are the origins of all activity,” had 
been “transmitted for several thousand years without changing their meaning.”7 Chinese 
learning and Western learning were seen effectively to occupy the same synchronous time, 
leading to supporters of ti/yong to view each side as both distinctive from yet supplementary 
to the other.8  Within this framework, newness did not signify a rupture in time so much as 
spatialized, cultural difference.  Ironically, for Zhang these differences only served to bring 
into relief a foundational equivalence between China and the West with respect to key social 
hierarchies: the ruler/minister, parent/child, and husband/wife relationships in both places 
look very similar, Zhang argues, although the rites for maintaining them are quite “crude” in 
Western countries.9 These hierarchical relationships are universal, to Zhang, because they 
form the basis of all political institutions and intellectual knowledge.10  In other words, these 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cultural Change in Late Qing China, ed. Rebecca E. Karl and Peter Gue Zarrow (Harvard 
University Asia Center, 2002), 79. 
6 Zhang Zhidong, Quan Xue Pian (Exhortation to Learning), ed. Fengxian Li (Beijing: 
Huaxia chubanshe, 2002), 3. 
7 Ibid., 34. 
8 Liu Longxin, Xueshu Yu Zhidu: Xueke Tizhi Yu Xiandai Zhongguo Shixue De Jianli (Taibei: 
Yuanliu chuban shiye, 2002), 27–28. 
9 Zhang, Quan Xue Pian, 34–36. 
10 Ibid., 36; as historian Liu Longxin has shown, however, the ti/yong binarism had the 
unintended effect of rupturing equivalences between the West and China, ultimately reducing 
Chinese learning to a series of distinct ethical principles rather than a more comprehensive 
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putative similarities not only demonstrate why China should retain its existing social 
structures; they also underwrite the very possibility of learning from the West. Only by 
building on shared foundations can China hope to succeed in exploiting Western knowledge. 
Another group of reformers offered a more radical vision of cultural difference when 
they attempted to locate China along a path of evolutionary development.  For some, such as 
Kang Youwei (康有爲 1858-1927) and Tan Sitong (譚嗣同 1865-1898), this development 
would proceed through a series of increasingly peaceful stages, fueled by the extension of 
human benevolence (ren). It would culminate in a cosmopolitan “great unity” (da tong), 
when all differences separating humanity would be existentially overcome.11  For their 
colleague Liang Qichao and the influential translator Yan Fu, however, the utopian future 
came only after a far more aggressive struggle for civilizational survival.  Strongly influenced 
by the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer, many of whose works Yan translated into 
Chinese, Liang and Yan saw history as driven by the domination of the stronger over the 
weaker.  China could succeed in the global struggle, they argued, only if its people became 
invigorated with the spirit to defend and unify themselves as a nation.12  Drawing from 
emerging work in sociology and anthropology, Liang called for a new history that would 
                                                                                                                                                        
system of knowledge that could benefit and be benefitted by Western learning. Liu, Xueshu 
Yu Zhidu, 29–32, 49–50. 
11 Sitong Tan, An Exposition of Benevolence: The Jen-Hsueh of T’an Ssu-T’ung (Hong Kong: 
Chinese University Press, 1984); Kang Youwei, Ta T’ung Shu: The One-World Philosophy of 
K’ang Yu-Wei, trans. Laurence G. Thompson (Allen & Unwin, 1958). 
12 e.g., Yan Fu, “Lun Shi Bian Zhi Ji,” in Yan Fu Ji, ed. Wang Chi (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 
1986); Yan Fu, “Yuan Qiang (On Strength),” in Yan Fu Ji, vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 
1985), 15–32; Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo,” in Yin Bing Shi Zhuan Ji (Shanghai: 
Zhonghua shu ju, 1936), 162. 
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understand China’s progress toward the modern era in terms of struggle between and within 
groups.13  Yan urged the cultivation of a promethean spirit of individualism—functioning 
very much like the psychic energy of Tan’s benevolence—to drive forward the collective 
wealth and power of civilization.14  
These reform positions were ultimately more radical because they turned not on 
synchronous cultural gaps, as Zhang Zhidong’s formulations did, but on diachronic historical 
lags.  On this view China appeared more tragically estranged from the West, because its lack 
of development seemed to deny the possibility that China already shared basic characteristics 
with successful civilizations.  But reformers did not need to ground reform in existing 
cultural equivalence when history promised eventually to deliver China from its abject state.  
Being swept up in a global and inevitable trend toward the future—what Yan Fu identified 
with the “urgency of change in the world”—assured China’s eventual convergence with 
Western nations and their stage of development.15    
By 1915, confronting the fragility of the Chinese polity after the republican revolution, 
Chinese thinkers had begun to contemplate a more radical break with their own past.16  They 
                                                 
13 Liang Qichao, “Zhongguo Shi Xulun,” in Yinbingshi Heji-wenji, vol. 6 (Beijing: Zhonghua 
shuju, 1994), 10–12. 
14 Charlotte Furth, “Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth 
Movement, 1895-1920,” in An Intellectual History of Modern China, ed. Merle Goldman and 
Leo Ou-fan Lee (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 25–27; Benjamin Isadore 
Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West (Cambridge: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 1964). 
15 Yan, “Lun Shi Bian Zhi Ji.” 
16 Chen Song, “Qian yan,” Wusi qian hou Dong Xi wenhua wenti lunzhan wenzuan (Biejing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1984) [hereafter WSWX], 2-4. 
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continued to historicize the spatialized understanding of “new” that marked their reform 
predecessors, seeing East/West differences as conflicts between historical epochs and not 
only between different types of national quality or psychology.17  But their explorations were 
increasingly tied to an erosion of confidence in the evolutionary models that drove late Qing 
reform thought, a turn with both domestic and international origins.  Globally scholars were 
growing critical of models of orthogenic, teleological development. They began exploring  
instead a more historical approach, influenced by German romanticism.  These new 
understandings of cultural growth were further developed by anthropologists such as Franz 
Boas, which resisted teleological determinism in favor of examining how individuals and 
groups interact with their material as well as social environments over time.18  In China, a 
lack of confidence in evolutionary models was instigated by revolutionary policies of Sun 
Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance (同盟會Tongmenghui) which offered a voluntaristic 
alternative to natural laws of an inexorable history.19  Reformers also increasingly came to 
see China’s backwardness as more intractable than they originally hoped.  After 1911, Liang 
Qichao, in a series of influential articles published in his newly-founded journals The Justice 
(庸言Yong Yan) and New China Magazine (大中華雜誌Da Zhonghua zazhi), began to 
attribute the political failures of the new republican regime to China’s flawed national 
character.  
                                                 
17 Zhang Dainian and Cheng Yishan, Zhongguo Wenhua Yu Wenhua Lunzheng (Chinese 
Culture and Cultural Debates) (Beijing: Renmin chu ban she, 1992), 351. 
18 Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea (University of California Press, 2003), 
287–288; George W. Stocking, “Franz Boas and the Culture Concept in Historical 
Perspective,” American Anthropologist 68, no. 4 (August 1, 1966): 867–882. 
19 Furth, “Intellectual Change,” 38. 
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Liang’s solution in some ways presaged the May Fourth movement, by urging a turn 
away from political reform toward cultural and social reform, or what Liang called “the work 
of society.”20  Chen Duxiu, in a 1915 essay first published in the radical political journal New 
Youth (新青年Xin Qingnian), also traced China’s inability to sustain a republican regime to 
its impartial grasp of what amounts to a holistic body of Western practices and thought.  In 
Chen’s view, the “old Chinese ways” (中國舊法子Zhongguo jiu fazi) and the “new Western 
ways” (西方新法子xifang xin fazi) each represented seamlessly coherent and interdependent 
wholes, whose contents were internally indivisible and irreducible. When juxtaposed, these 
old and new ways were “like fire and water, or ice and coal; they absolutely cannot co-exist.  
If you want both to be carried out together, then you will simply produce something that is 
neither fish nor fowl and neither [old nor new] will be successful.”21  Unlike Liang Qichao, 
however, Chen explicitly ascribes these “old ways” to civilizational characteristics: the 
“unifying spirit” of “Eastern peoples,” Chen claims, lies in “contentment,”22  but to succeed 
                                                 
20 Liang Qichao, “Zhengzhi Zhi Jichu Yu Yanlunjia Zhi Zhizhen,” in Da Zhonghua Zazhi, 
reprint., Jindai Zhongguo Shiliao Congkan Xubian (Taibei: Wenhua chubanshe, 1915), 233–
255; for further discussion see Zongmian Xu, “Shibaizhe De Tansuo: 1913-1915 Nian Jian 
Guanyu Zhongguo Ruhe Shixian Minzhu Zhengzhi De Taolun,” Lishi Yanjiu, no. 4 (1984): 
23–44; Leigh Jenco, “‘Rule by Man’ and ‘Rule by Law’ in Early Republican China: 
Contributions to a Theoretical Debate,” The Journal of Asian Studies 69, no. 1 (February 
2010): 181–203. 
21 Chen Duxiu, “Jinri Zhongguo zhi zhengzhi wenti,” 270. Unless otherwise noted, all page 
numbers for Chen Duxiu’s essays refer to the reprints in Chen Duxiu Wenzhang Xuanbian, 
vol. 1 (Beijing: Sanlian, 1984). 
22 Chen, “Dong Xi minzu genben sixiang zhi chayi,” New Youth 1.4 (December 1915).  
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as a republic they required the strenuous dynamism of Western civilizations to support 
human rights, drive evolution forward, and institute socialism—three components that Chen 
deemed both necessary and sufficient to constitute Western culture.23   
This binary of Chinese or “Eastern” culture, characterized by spirituality and quietude, 
versus the “Western” culture of materialism and activity, is invoked throughout the New 
Culture and May Fourth movements to justify the need for both more moderate and more 
radical policies.  It finds particularly bold articulation in Du Yaquan’s careful responses to 
calls by Chen, as well as by the “first voice” of the Chinese Renaissance, Huang Yuanyong 
(黄遠庸 1885-1915), for a totalistic reappraisal of Chinese culture’s future prospects.24  The 
essays debating such views appeared in two of the most influential journals of the time, the 
Eastern Miscellany (東方雜誌 Dongfang zazhi, under Du’s editorship from the journal’s 
founding in 1904 until 1920) and the radical organ New Youth.  According to historian Wang 
Qisheng, the Eastern and Western civilizations debate marks the first time two journals in 
China engaged in direct criticism of each other. Chen’s virulent (and inaccurate) attacks on 
defenders of Eastern civilization as imperial restorationists resulted in a publicity triumph for 
                                                 
23 Chen, “Falanxi ren yu jinshi wenming,” New Youth 1.1 (Sept. 15, 1915), 79. 
24 Hu Shi, “Wushinian Lai Zhongguo Zhi Wenxue,” in Hu Shi Wencun (Luoyang: Luoyang 
tushu gongsi, 1985), 180–261; Tse-tsung Chow, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual 
Revolution in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 272, 338.  Huang 
had acquired his jinshi degree in the final year of the civil examinations, going on to study 
law in Japan before making his name as a Beijing-based special reporter for the Shanghai 
periodicals Shibao and Shenbao. He was the very first to call for a modeling of Chinese 
literature and thought on that of Renaissance Europe, but did not live to see the movement he 
heralded come to fruition. He was assassinated in San Francisco by an agent of Yuan Shikai 
in 1915 (see Huters, Bringing the World Home, 211).   
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New Youth, which by 1919 had effectively traded places with Eastern Miscellany as the most 
widely circulated journal of the time.25  Despite the acrimony of these debates, Wang 
Yuanhua has noted that they produced some of the first work in China to advance substantive 
comparative research on Sino-Western culture, which definitively shaped subsequent 
discussions of Westernization and cultural identity.26   
Both sides array themselves around an East-West binary that, as a geographical trope, 
organizes the physical location of thought and its movements through space. In many ways 
their approach resembles that of the late Qing reformers, in that perceived failures of national 
character spatialize what are ultimately seen to be differences in historical development.  For 
Kang and his colleagues, however, history was a unitary process. Its movement was unilinear 
and shared by everyone, even if certain societies lagged behind others in embodying its 
ultimate promise.  Liang Qichao could therefore claim China’s past had no place in world 
history, because it had previously lacked transformative contact with the West, which he saw 
as the most powerful embodiment of that historical telos.27 It was on the basis of this 
immanent similarity to Western and all other nations in the world that China could mark its 
progress and find guidance for reform.  With the civilizations debate, however, the spatial 
binary also marks how thought or ideas move through time within those spaces.  History 
appears not as an unchanging yardstick to mark cultural difference, but as something that 
itself gives rise to, and bears traces of, diverse civilizational development.  This historical 
consciousness did not as easily support arguments about the inevitable persistence of one 
                                                 
25 Wang Qisheng, “Xin Wenhua Shi Ruhe ‘Yun Dong’ Qilai De? Yi Xin Qingnian Wei 
Shidian,” Jindai Shi Yanjiu 1 (2007): 31. 
26 “Du Yaquan yu Dong Xi wenhua wenti lunzhan,” Du Yaquan wencun; reprinted in Chensi 
yu fansi (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2007), 99. 
27 Liang, “Zhongguo Shi Xulun 中國史敍論,” 2. 
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cultural heritage over another, but rather encouraged exploration of how historical patterns of 
development could be replicated or manipulated in other locales and different futures.   
Accordingly, these thinkers ask primarily about the kind of past that will inspire a 
particular kind of (Chinese) future.  Is China’s past one iteration of a more general, global 
phenomenon, such that continuing into the future can not only effectively draw from, but may 
require the pro-active imitation of, forms of Western modernity? Or does its own past offer 
one of the only coherent available platforms for building a better, truly global civilization?  
Moderate and radical responses to these dilemmas, I will argue, stem less from disagreements 
about the character or persistence of China’s cultural heritage than about its capacity to serve 
as a foundation for future transformation, and what exactly that future might look like.     
 
Moderate Views 
A key touchstone of the debate emerged when, in his 1916 article “Quietistic 
Civilization and Active Civilization,” the influential editor of the Eastern Miscellany, Du 
Yaquan, suggested that the difference between Eastern and Western civilizations is not one of 
degree (chengdu) but of kind (xingzhi).28  For Du, quietistic civilizations (jing de wenming) 
are best represented by Eastern cultures, the Chinese one in particular, and are characterized 
by fairly homogenous populations that emphasize nature over human agency, family over 
interactions with strangers, and minimizing conflict rather than accepting it as an inevitable 
part of existence.29 The milieu for the active civilization (dong de wenming) is the city, with 
                                                 
28 Du Yaquan, “Jing de wenming yu dong de wenming,” Eastern Miscellany 13.10 (October 
1916), 338.  Unless otherwise noted, all page numbers for Du’s essays cited here refer to the 
reprints in Xu Jilin and Tian Jianye, eds. Du Yaquan Wencun (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu 
chubanshe, 2003).  
29 Du, “Jing de wenming,” 338-340. 
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its vibrant and complicated atmosphere; for a passive civilization, it is the countryside, with a 
comfortable and self-satisfied atmosphere.30  Du believes these differences arise from a 
variety of distinct geographic and historical conditions that gave rise either to conflict and 
pluralism (in the Western case) or to self-sufficiency and homogeneity (the Chinese case).  
Because Western society developed not inland but on waterways, seacoasts, and peninsulas, 
for example, it tended toward heterogeneity, externally-oriented struggles, and 
individualism.31   
Li Dazhao’s 1918 essay “The Fundamental Differences Between Eastern and Western 
Civilizations” further elaborated the consequences of these historical contingencies, tying 
particular “activist” or “quietistic” features to the past material challenges of civilizations.  
According to Li, it was because Eastern civilizations—members of the “southern” belt of 
societies that Li identifies with Japan, Indo-China, India, Afghanistan, Egypt, and others—
enjoyed so much economic prosperity and ease that they failed to cultivate the strenuous 
dynamism and ambition that characterizes the “northern” societies (among which he names 
Mongolia, Russia, Germany, Holland, Belize, England, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, 
and Italy).32  Because the former had a bounty of women, for example, it promoted polygamy; 
but because the latter had fewer women than men, it promoted single-wife families.  In fact, 
northern belt societies had to fight for survival, forcing their peoples to migrate frequently in 
search of stability and food. This encouraged simpler, smaller families, Li explains, which in 
turn led to an emphasis on individualism.  Because Eastern civilizations did not feel there was 
value to fighting for anything, and (as a result of their family structure) did not value 
                                                 
30 Du, “Jing de wenming,” 341. 
31 Du, “Jing de wenming,” 338-9. 
32 Li, “Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian,” Yan zhi  3 (July 1918); reprinted in Chen Song, 
WSWX, 57. 
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individual effort, they tend even now to pessimism and fatalism; in contrast, Western 
civilizations had to struggle constantly for survival, endowing them with a strong optimism in 
human agency to transform the future, and cultivating what Li calls (using English words) the 
“creative progressionism” [chuang hua zhu yi] that is the characteristic of “active” 
civilizations.33 
 These historical causal narratives add greater dimension to moderate resistance to 
New Culture radicalism, but not because they signal intransigent allegiance to some fixed 
Chinese past or reject “Westernization.”  In fact, Du embraced Western science very early in 
his life, studying calculus and algebra in his early twenties before going on to teach in 
Western schools and translate books on chemistry and physics.34  Both Li and Du use their 
historical narratives of civilizations to project futures for East and West, urging an eventual 
syncretism of both to take place not only in China but in the world itself.  Noting the warm 
reception in Germany of their colleague Gu Hongming (辜鴻銘 1827-1928) and his popular 
English-language tracts on Confucian ethics, these moderates suggest that this hybrid future 
form—what Li calls “a new third civilization” beyond both East and West—will salve a 
battered Europe as much as invigorate a subordinated China.35  As China’s “second 
contribution” to world thought, Li Dazhao believes, this move would combine together “the 
best parts” of Eastern and Western civilization, blending the former’s quietism into the 
latter’s activism.36   This possibility turns, however, on Chinese historical developments 
substituting for Western ones.  As Du explains, 
                                                 
33 Li, “Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian,” 58.  
34 Liu Shaotang, ed., “Du Yaquan (1873-1933),” Minguo Ren Wu Xiao Zhuan (Taibei: Zhuan 
ji wen xue, 1975), 71. 
35 Li, “Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian,” 60.   
36 Li, “Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian,” 62.  
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The path to salvation lies precisely in integrating our original civilization, 
systematizing its foundations so as to render it lucid, and where it has mistakes to 
correct them.  On the one hand we must strenuously import Western theories, and 
allow them to blend with our original civilization. The fragments of Western 
civilization are like money strewn on the ground; we can use our original civilization 
as a thread to tie them together.  The wide variety of Western theories today, when 
you at first hear them, seem to be incompatible with our original civilization; but then 
when you understand them more fully, you can see that they can enhance and develop 
certain parts of our original civilization.37   
 
Part of the problem with using Western civilization as a foundation, Du argues, is that it lacks 
the unity and continuity of Chinese civilization.  In the past few centuries and most notably 
during the current war, European values have fragmented, with the result that borrowing 
them leads only to increasing confusion and incoherence.  Although some Western ideas—
science, democracy, constitutionalism—offer promising solutions to China’s current 
problems, their “activistic” qualities offer no integrated system adequate to direct the future 
course of world civilization.38  Responding to Chen Duxiu’s insinuation that by supporting 
particular aspects of Chinese civilization he is necessarily opposing republican government, 
Du points out the similarities between indigenous ideals and Western regime types.  
 
Political regimes may change, but the political principles [behind them] do not. 
Therefore, taking our indigenous civilization, with ‘the way of the ruler, the integrity 
                                                 
37 Du, “Mi luan zhi xiandai ren xin,” Eastern Miscellany 15.4 (April 1918), 367. 
38 Du, “Mi luan zhi xiandai ren xin,” 363. 
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of the official, and traditional moral teaching’ [君道臣节名教纲常jun dao, chen jie, 
ming jiao gang chang] as its foundation, and blending it with modern political forms 
in a fully coherent way, is indeed something that a proper civilization [正統文明
zhengtong wenming] can do.39   
 
The Chinese cannot adopt features of activist civilizations, in other words, if they repudiate 
their own past heritage; doing so would be to obliterate the civilizational unity endowed to 
the Chinese by history and which alone makes possible their cultural development.40   
Significantly, Li and Du do not characterize these historical conditions, or the future 
developments they enable, as universal ones; different civilizations are not all aligned along 
the same track.  Each follow their respective organic path forward.  At the same time, 
however, these historical conditions are not so unique to particular civilizations that the 
migration of certain practices or ideas across cultural boundaries is constrained.  Du believes 
that the existing Chinese civilization contains enough similarity with the Western past to 
inaugurate a syncretic, partially-Western future on Chinese soil.  But unlike Zhang Zhidong, 
who two decades earlier posited universal human hierarchies as the shared basis upon which 
Western learning could proceed in China, Du sees these similarities as serendipitous 
coincidences. Democracy and science could flourish in China not because they were 
autonomous practices independent of their civilizational and social milieus, but precisely 
                                                 
39 Du, “Da Xin Qingnian zazhi jizhe zhi zhi wen,” Eastern Miscellany 15.12 (December 
1918), 371.  Du is responding to Chen’s “Zhi wen Dongfang zazhi jizhe,” New Youth 5.3 
(September 1918). For discussion of the tensions between Du’s advocacy of civilizational 
integrity and his commitment to blending old and new, see Wang Yuanhua, “Du Yaquan,” 
99-100. 
40 Du, “Mi luan zhi xiandai ren xin,” 363. 
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because their reliance on this cultural background could already be partially supplied by the 
existing Chinese civilization.  Li goes farther, to explore the possibility that the past historical 
conditions of one civilization could be replicated in the future of the other.  He suggests that 
transformations in the economic and social conditions of both Asian and European peoples 
may be enough to effect transformations in their thought, if not in the present then in the 
future—once they generate a history whose contingencies provoke the proper characteristic 
responses and lifestyles.  “It is a reality that you cannot easily get results [by borrowing from 
the West]. Yet if in daily life we practice it and accept its positive influence, so that we begin 
to be immersed [in it], a quietist life will be changed into an activist one,” and vice-versa.41   
From this perspective, Gu Hongming’s efforts in Germany to promote Confucian 
ethics as an alternative to postwar materialism are the most prominent demonstrations of this 
capacity for cultural mobility. In his book The Spirit of the Chinese People, published in 
English in 1915, Gu singles out Confucianism’s emphasis not on abstract ethics but on the 
cultivation of the “gentleman,” which ties individual behavior to his family and to the state in 
an integrated, normative ethos of loyalty and filiality.  “The Spirit of the Chinese People,” Gu 
explains, “is a state of mind, a temper of the soul, which you cannot learn as you learn 
shorthand or Esperanto; in short, a mood, or in the words of the poet, a serene and blessed 
mood.”42  Gu’s reception in Europe was documented in Ping Yi’s (平佚) 1918 essay 
“Critiques of Chinese and Western Civilizations” (中西文明之评判Zhong Xi wenming zhi 
pingpan), which lists various German responses—both supportive and critical—to Gu’s call 
                                                 
41 Li, “Dong Xi wenming genben zhi yi dian,” 66. 
42 The Spirit of the Chinese People (Beijing: Peking Daily News, 1915), 72. 
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to Europeans to embrace Eastern spiritualism.43 Although none of these German intellectuals 
seem ready to embrace this version of Confucianism wholesale, Gu’s invitation suggests to 
what degree Chinese moderates and conservatives saw “Eastern” civilization as a mobile, if 
sticky and complex, repository of historically accumulated value, rather than a set of cultural 
characteristics permanently inhering in some particular ethnic group.  
 
Radical Views 
This emphasis on the radical mobility of both Chinese and Western values, lifestyles, 
and even historical trajectories belies radical accusations (most prominently launched by 
Chen Duxiu around 1918) that Du and his colleagues hoped to restore the feudal Chinese past 
in the modern present.44 The more striking difference between these two positions lies not in 
some professed allegiance either to the past or the future, but more precisely in their 
disagreement over how and if the inauguration of “new thought” depends on a particular kind 
of past. Moderates tended to see a new future syncretized from currently-localized 
civilizational characteristics, which—precisely because they took shape within the trajectory 
of an existing civilization—could also be seen as imminently mobile across space, given 
enough time. Radicals, in contrast, attempted to efface the legacy of the Chinese past entirely. 
The mobility of cultural or civilizational characteristics for these radicals was made possible 
                                                 
43 Ping Yi平佚, trans. “Zhong Xi wenming zhi pingpan“ (Critiques of Chinese and Western 
Civilizations), Eastern Miscellany 15.6 (June 1918); original published in Japanese in 
Dongya zhi guang (Light of East Asia). 
44 Chen Duxiu, “Questions for the Writers of the Eastern Miscellany” (Zhi wen Dongfang 
zazhi jizhe)  New Youth 5. 3 (September 1918), Sec. 2. He also rather perfunctorily dismissed 
the possibility of Europeans learning from Chinese civilization as “rigmarole” (meng yi). 
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precisely by rejecting the characterization of Chinese history as a trove of fruitful similarities 
to the Western past. 
In the 1916 essay “The Conflict Between Old and New,” which was published 
posthumously one year after its author, Huang Yuanyong, was assassinated in San Francisco, 
Western historical events are arrayed in temporal ways to foreground their generality rather 
than cultural or spatial specificity.  Like Li Dazhao, Huang depicts Western thought as 
historically rooted, but for Huang this history has produced not a reified set of civilizational 
characteristics so much as a body of discourse that has changed through time in response to 
new challenges and ideas.  Huang identifies three stages in the transformation of all 
thought—the age of unawareness, the age of critique, and the age of consolidation of 
doctrines—yet historical variegation does not, for Huang, comprise an adequate measure of 
“old” and “new.”45  Newness lies as much in the content of thought (sixiang) as in its 
periodization.  To enter the (relatively newer) age of critique, the Chinese must oppose the 
(older) age of unawareness by rejecting the “old”—which Huang summarizes as advocacy of 
dogmatism rather than criticism, force-based government rather than self-control, integration 
rather than analysis, and deduction rather than induction. Only then can the Chinese embrace 
the proper content of thought that for Huang epitomizes the new.46   
By selecting temporal terms rather than spatial ones, Huang attempts to culturally 
dissociate “new thought” in general from the specificities of Western experience. In doing so, 
he hopes to establish the grounds for its possibility in other spaces and times. “Today people 
like to say that each nation has its own history and habits, and they cannot be forced to be all 
the same. Of course this is true; but actually this ‘dissimilarity’ should be understood to be 
                                                 
45 Huang, “Xin jiu sixiang zhi chongtu,” reprinted in Du Yaquan wencun, 358. 
46 Huang, “Xin jiu sixiang zhi chongtu,” Eastern Miscellany 13.2 (Feb 1916), 361. 
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relative, not absolute.”47  Huang cannot extricate new thought from Western thought as 
completely as he claims, however, for the very reason that he can neither supply a Chinese 
equivalent to new thought nor sensibly periodize Western history in terms of old and new. 
The very historical story he offers turns on a substantive rather than temporal parsing of those 
terms, where his examples of “progressive,” “new” thought are culled as often from the 
Western past—namely the scientific spirit of the ancient Greeks—as from the present.  For 
these reasons he remains unable to explain on what basis Chinese can enter, and by way of 
what force they can be driven along, the stream of historical time that transforms their 
thought from one age to another.48 
Huang’s colleague, Chen Duxiu, more directly handles the problem of historically 
situating the progress to “new thought.” He does this not by severing the connection between 
newness and Westernness, as Huang does, but by transposing a Chinese future onto a 
Western past. In his essay “The Year 1916,” sometimes read as a call to Chinese youth to 
insert themselves in a stream of modern time, Chen clearly marks the present as the mediator 
between the past and future.49  Significantly, however, he locates that past not in Chinese 
time but in that of “humanity” (renlei) and “the world” (shijie), two categories he comes to 
conflate with Western civilization, even as their presence in Chinese space can be established 
by a distinctly new and temporal attitude on the part of China’s youth:  
                                                 
47 Huang, “Xin jiu sixiang zhi chongtu,” 358. 
48 A similar three-stage model of thought (from unawareness to critique to consolidation) 
would eventually be offered by Liang Qichao in his Qing dai xueshu gailun. But there, Liang 
had read these stages as explicitly cyclical rather than progressive: Qing Dai Xueshu Gailun 
(Summary of Scholarship Under the Qing Dynasty) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 
2005). 
49 Lee, “Incomplete Modernity,” 32. 
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In order to give birth to this century, we must hold our heads up high and accept the 
responsibility of becoming twentieth century people, create the twentieth century 
civilization, and not remain dominated by nineteenth century civilization.  The 
progress of human civilization replaces the old with the new, like the flow of water or 
the path of an arrow; each age transforms and follows from the other.50 
 
Chen formulates this radicalism, significantly, largely on the assertion that the Chinese 
people lack a history. It is their inability to exhibit change across time that condemns their 
culture to stagnation and justifies the assumption of a new, Western future: “[As for] Eastern 
peoples, from the time of hunter-gatherers all the way to [the establishment of] kinship 
society to now, nothing has changed…kinship society takes family as the standard, and the 
individual has no rights.”51  For Chen, only the West has a history. By adopting Western 
ideas, China is, in essence, assuming that history as its own, joining other nation-states as 
their common history unfolds in modern time and progresses to the future.  
In light of this radical call to arms, Du’s invocation of China’s “indigenous” 
civilization appears as a defense of a present state whose characteristics he believes can 
continue into the foreseeable future. Du, after all, does not defend the past but rather attempts 
to give compelling content to a very present form of life, albeit one rooted in a particular 
historical trajectory and geographic location (Eastern versus Western, countryside versus 
city), that contrasts with the form of life defended by Chen and other radicals as explicitly 
“Western.”  Underlying Chen’s assertion, in contrast, is the insight that only by adopting a 
culture which turns on dynamism, activity, and deliberate efforts at change can temporal 
                                                 
50 Chen, “Yi jiu yi liu nian,” 101. 
51 Chen Duxiu, “Dong Xi minzu genben sixiang zhi chayi,” 98. 
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distinctions (between past and present, present and future) even be meaningful.  Chen and Du 
conflict, it seems, over more than the normative weight of Chinese and Western civilization; 
they also disagree about how to characterize the present moment as an inaugural point for 
China’s future. 
 
Envisioning Change 
Reading the Eastern and Western Civilizations debates as conflicts over historical 
understanding suggests new contours to the characteristic agendas of the New Culture and 
May Fourth movements.  These movements do not simply represent a political match 
between “traditionalists,” who resist modernity out of futile allegiance to an extinct past that 
they hope to revive, and “radicals,” who blindly destroy a past heritage in the name of 
progress.  Their disagreement rather stems from different responses to the question: In what, 
or whose, history can China be said to belong? The temporal processes assumed in their 
conversations thus do more than ascribe Eastern or Western cultural products to particular 
streams of “modern” or “traditional” time, as scholars of Chinese modernity have noted.52  
Spatial terms mark not only the locales in which knowledge circulates, but also the particular 
pasts—and thus futures—toward which Chinese thinkers align themselves.  Their particular 
ways of thinking about change, then, do not drive their view of Eastern and Western 
civilizations, but rather emerges out of their exploration of those alternative historical 
models.53   
                                                 
52 e.g., Levenson, Confucian China; Lee, “In Search of Modernity.” 
53 c.f. Huters, Bringing the World Home, 206, who argues that “the disposition of each thinker 
toward the nature of and the possibility for change colored his views of where these changes 
were to come from and how they were to be effected.” 
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 These civilizational histories offered alternatives to the universal, homogenous trend 
of evolution envisioned by late Qing thinkers, which portrayed social and political change in 
terms of the gradual alignment of Chinese particularity with the European nation-state form.   
Robert Culp has recently argued that, for many of the Republican-era intellectuals influenced 
by this vision of a universal, homogenous, and evolving world civilization, “simultaneous but 
different trajectories of social, economic, and political change were difficult to imagine.”54    
Participants in the civilization debates, in contrast, wrestle with a growing awareness that all 
cultures or civilizations have a historical career whose experiences encouraged the 
development of certain institutions and attitudes and discouraged others.  This awareness 
gives rise to the relatively novel idea that different civilizations may occupy a shared global 
space without enduring the same processes of time—their historical developments may be 
mutually out of joint. The rifts between their respective historical careers undercuts beliefs 
that earlier had sustained claims to shared global similarity. No longer did thinkers assume 
that the world’s civilizations are inevitably heading in the same direction, arose from the 
same source, or possess permanent values or proclivities somehow isolated from the flow of 
time.  
It was not the homogeneity of a universal time, then, that compelled Chen Duxiu to 
demand a break from China’s past.  If he could assume that Europeanization was an 
inevitable global trend, he would be better able to picture (as Liang Qichao did) China’s past 
                                                 
54 Robert J. Culp, “‘Weak and Small Peoples’ in a ‘Europeanizing World’: World History 
Textbooks and Chinese Intellectuals’ Perspectives on Global Modernity,” in The Politics of 
Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China, ed. Tze-Ki Hon and Robert J. 
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as the embryonic form of a Western future.55  Instead, precisely because the civilizations 
debate had introduced the possibility of multiple, civilizationally distinct historical 
trajectories, Chen had to think about the present as a site for enacting the future without 
assuming continuity with the Chinese past.  His creative solution is to re-draw the path of 
continuity, connecting China’s present to the world’s future rather than to China’s own past.  
China becomes part of the world not by contributing its accumulated cultural essences to a 
global mélange, but by working in the present and future to unite its fate with that of the 
emerging global order.  In practice, of course, drawing that connection was quite difficult, 
and not only because no “Western” models of development ever offered clear and 
unambiguous guidance. It was also the case, as Sang Bing explains in another essay in this 
journal, that the very definition of continuity was elusive.  Establishing in China a supposedly 
more modern and “authentic” vernacular, for example, simply shored up a particular and 
static version of language that defied the very evolutionary and cosmopolitan principles 
driving language reform in the first place.56   For Chen, however, the process of tying China’s 
present to Europe’s future presented a series of very clear and deliberate choices between 
Western values (represented by “Mr. Democracy” and “Mr. Science”) and Eastern ones:  
 
If you want to endorse Mr. Democracy, you cannot but oppose Confucian religion, the 
system of rites, chastity, old ethics, and old government. If you want to endorse Mr. 
Science, you cannot but oppose old art, old religion. If you want to endorse Mr. 
                                                 
55 Peter Zarrow, “Old Myth into New History: The Building Blocks of Liang Qichao’s ‘New 
History’,” Historiography East & West 1, no. 2 (July 2003): 212, 215. 
56 Sang Bing, “The Divergence and Convergence of the Written and the Spoken Languages: 
Reassessing the Vernacular Language during the May Fourth Period,” this issue.  
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Democracy, you cannot but endorse Mr. Science, and you cannot but oppose national 
essence and the old culture.57 
 
In other words, he envisions the project of modernization and even “Westernization” in 
political terms: its promise is secured not by history but only by human agency working in 
and through time.   
Ironically, precisely because moderate opinion had raised the possibility of alternative 
trajectories—and thus alternative ways of reading China’s past—Chen was able to provide a 
partial answer to the paradox of fate versus agency that plagued Liang, Kang and Yan at the 
turn of the century. As Charlotte Furth has observed, their beliefs in the inevitability of 
unilinear, world-historical progress were paired with a persistent anxiety over its relative 
incompleteness at any given time.58  These anxieties rendered deeply ambivalent the role of 
the reformer as a historical actor: if the end of history is inevitable, what role could any 
reforming sage possibly play?59 How could sages remain helpless to stop changes in the 
world, but at the same time be responsible for holding China back?60  In contrast, Chen 
understands the future as the outcome of choices, not the unfolding of a series of inevitable 
transformations.  The realization that such political choices needed to be made constitutes the 
Chinese people’s “final awakening,” in which they “take stock of the basic trends going on 
inside and outside,” and begin to ask about “what stage our people and our nation ultimately 
                                                 
57 Chen, “Xin Qingnian zui an zhi da bian shu,” New Youth 6.1 (January 15, 1919), 317.  
58 Furth, “Intellectual Change,” 16. 
59 Ibid., 16–31. 
60 Yan, “Lun Shi Bian Zhi Ji”; for discussion, see James Reeve Pusey, China and Charles 
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occupy. What stage of actions ought they to take?”61  For Chen this awakening is necessarily 
first political, and then ethical. It involves coming to terms, first, with the fact that the people, 
not their leaders, are the primary motors of change and transformation in society; and second 
that this political capacity is at odds with the ethics of hierarchy that structured political life 
in traditional Chinese society.62  China’s future demands breaking free of the “inertia” (duo 
xing) that effaced China’s history and rendered its people incapable of republican rule.63   
For Du Yaquan and Li Dazhao, this inertia stems from the embeddedness of societies 
in historically situated “civilizations.” Despite Chen’s accusations, however, neither Du nor 
Li claims that the Chinese must be forever bound to replicate in the present and future 
whatever social patterns they happen to have exhibited in the past (as, for example, Liang 
Qichao concluded in 1904 after his tour of American Chinatowns.)  Du can coherently speak 
of Chinese “happily putting themselves in the middle of [active society],” and identify a 
minority Chinese population of “active” types, without for that reason contradicting himself 
about the nature of China’s “quietistic civilization.”64  Moderate disagreement with Chen lies 
not so much in their rejection of Western institutions, ideas, or even “modernity,” but in their 
rejection of the possibility that China’s future can be grafted unproblematically and 
immediately onto a Western present (rather than the other way around).  New ways of living 
demand not only political choices and ethical re-orientations, but a domestic historical 
background to supply the continuity underlying all development—much as Li Dazhao 
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implied that a blending of quietistic and activist civilizations would demand that Chinese 
history become the West’s future, and vice-versa.   
Their position presages Li Changzhi’s later critique of the failures of the May Fourth 
movement, which blames radicals not for their extremity but for their shallowness. Their 
movement, to Li, “was a rushed replay of Western intellectual evolution—once they stepped 
onto another person’s path, they had to relive that historical experience.”65 Radicals like 
Chen failed to recognize, in other words, that the West, too, had a particular history that both 
produced and sustained its existing practices, and without reproducing this history they could 
never effectively grow this cultural transplant in “the rich nutrients of [their] native soil.”66 
Du Yaquan’s understanding of this historicity emerges only uncertainly, as he seeks reasons 
for how the originally existing (gu you) Chinese civilization could enjoy normative 
supremacy over the Western one, independently of any particular quality inherent in it.  
Others, such as Li Dazhao, work more forthrightly with the historical embeddedness implied 
by the civilization vocabulary. Li seemed to believe that China in the future would have to 
grow a past equivalent to that of the West’s in order to replicate its institutions, and that 
Western nations would also have to adopt particular Chinese forms of life in order to take 
advantage of the benefits of “quietistic” civilizations.   
In neither case is the past understood as simply a repository of values, the perpetual 
and unchanging Chinese “essence” that gives meaning to equally unchanging Western “use.”  
“The West” and “China” appear in these conversations as both targets and agents of 
deliberate, time-dependent, and contested cultural appropriation. They are spaces whose past 
is not so much a known entity as it is a source of emergent meaning, which derives from, 
rather than gives rise to, contested visions of an uncertain future.  Elaborations of “Eastern” 
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and “Western” characteristics endow particular pasts with normative weight, but these pasts 
function to induce dilemmas of choice about the future, rather than to decisively and 
inevitably point in one direction rather than another. From moderate perspectives, these 
civilizational tropes mark objects of imitation and thus of mutual transformation in a 
synthetic future.  From more radical perspectives, they are targets of appropriation or 
rejection whose contrasts only serve to underscore how uncertainly China’s path matches that 
of the West.   
In any case, the plasticity of historical consciousness enabled May Fourth thinkers of 
both camps to investigate the slow and uncertain process of how ideas are diffused across 
space, transmitted through time, and come to have meaning within localized but not 
impermeable communities.  These new ways of looking at culture may have facilitated the 
sweeping visions of civilizational transformation offered by Liang Qichao and Liang 
Shuming in the 1920s. The latter’s reworked evolutionism—now rid of the value hierarchy 
between East and West67— turned precisely on the assumption that particular civilizational 
characteristics migrate across spaces to embody global patterns of evolution.68  For the 
former, it became possible to revoke modernity as a progressive temporality, and to discover 
instead “a dynamic anthropological space in separate but interacting cultural systems, which 
became accessible and appreciable only in a new global imaginary of difference.”69 
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Conclusion 
When the synthesis, rejection, or appropriation of Western norms and practices is 
understood as a process that takes place in and through time, their diffusion becomes a matter 
of deliberate selection in the present, open to future contingency. The East-West civilizations 
discourse reveals just how fragile, and ambivalent, is the future of “Western” civilization in 
the “East”—a contingency that undercuts claims to the universality and naturalness of 
Western histories, claims, and knowledge.70 Far from shoring up Western modernity as a 
universal goal, these May Fourth attempts to emulate and resist it actually contest a priori 
claims about its normative status or applicability of its ideas, institutions, and way of life. 
Even for radical perspectives such as Chen’s, who see a clear similarity of values among all 
the “ordered” countries of the world, the West and its values are the objects of political action, 
and no longer the telos of history.71 The debate therefore troubles the persistence and 
permanence, if not existence, of the discursive authority of the modern West.   
Ironically, this instability of Western modernity—or at least, its delegation from the 
category of historical certainty to political promise—makes available new space to envision  
China’s place in the modern world.  In understanding localized cultural characteristics as 
emerging from a past whose future transmission was radically indeterminate, participants 
clear ground for the recognition of global difference. They also, however, enable new forms 
of connection between otherwise disparate groups, by showing how the very passage of time 
which endowed civilizations with particular characteristics facilitates rather than inhibits the 
adoption of those characteristics elsewhere.  For proponents of the radical argument, the 
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mobility of Western science and democracy enabled Chinese modernization. From a more 
moderate perspective, the integrity of Chinese civilization assures the success of Western 
cultural grafts, even as the historically tight but now uncertain attachment of Confucian ethics 
to its native society becomes rearticulated as a capacity for their broader application to non-
Asian societies, most particularly postwar Europe.   
The point of their “Eastern” and “Western” tropes, then, may not be to sort 
civilizational characteristics into categories of the inevitably universal and the irredeemably 
particular (read: “cultural”), but to facilitate the travel of cultural products and practices 
across the spatial as well as temporal boundaries originally seen to contain them.  By denying 
the inevitable inherence of cultural characteristics in particular persons or groups, the May 
Fourth debate  reveals “East” and “West” to be spatial categories deeply contingent on human 
actions to situate communities within a variety of alternate trajectories.  These thinkers thus 
made it possible to see the future, and not only the past, as a site of cultural identification and 
possibility. 
